Battle Of Mogadishu: Anatomy Of A Failure

Battle Of Mogadishu: Anatomy Of A Failure

By applying Cohen and Goochâ€™s model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. GEN Hoar and GEN Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powellâ€™s approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspinâ€™s real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspinâ€™s acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TFR operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred.

While better policy coordination from the Secretary of Defense down to TFR could have prevented the 3 October 1993 raid from occurring, TFR did have all the means in Mogadishu to successfully accomplish the mission. However, overconfidence in TFRâ€™s capabilities and underestimation of the enemyâ€™s ability to find and attack TFR vulnerabilities were critical failures that led to a series of other failures. First, TFR did not request the AC-130s and extra platoon. Second, TFR conducted the 3 October raid without protecting its vulnerable helicopters. Third, TF planners failed to utilize all their available resources and integrate these resources into a plan that could be flexible enough to handle the threat and all the friction in this risky operation.

This paper demonstrates that TF Rangerâ€™s 3 October mission failed as a result of the organization, not the decisions of Secretary Aspin alone. As Cohen and Gooch observed, military misfortune is not merely the result of an individual mistake, but rather, the result of series of mistakes throughout a system. Ultimately, TFR and the system it was working in failed to anticipate and adapt.

Country	USA
Author	Major Roger N. Sangvic
Binding	Kindle Edition
Edition	PPP1 - Kindle Formatted
Format	Kindle eBook
IsAdultProduct
Label	Pickle Partners Publishing
Manufacturer	Pickle Partners Publishing
NumberOfPages	71
PublicationDate	2014-09-22
Publisher	Pickle Partners Publishing
ReleaseDate	2014-09-22
Studio	Pickle Partners Publishing