Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral

Description Specifications
Description
Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics
- Used Book in Good Condition
In recent years renewed attention has been directed to the importance of the role of institutional design in democratic politics. Particular interest has concerned constitutional design and the relative merits of parliamentary versus presidential systems. A virtual consensus has formed around the argument that parliamentary systems are preferable overall to presidential systems, due largely to the loss of power to the executive and assembly in presidential systems. In this book, the authors systematically assess the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of presidential systems, drawing on recent developments in the theoretical literature about institutional design and electoral rules. They develop a typology of democratic regimes that are structured around the separation of powers principle, including two hybrid forms, the premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems, and they evaluate a number of alternative ways of balancing powers between the branches within these basic frameworks. They also demonstrate that electoral rules are critically important in determining how authority can be exercised within these systems, describing the range of electoral rules that can be instituted and the effects they have on the shape of party systems, on the political agenda, and on the prospects for cooperation between presidents and assemblies.
Specifications
Country USA
Brand Cambridge University Press
Manufacturer Cambridge University Press
Binding Paperback
ItemPartNumber 9780521429900
UnitCount 1
EANs 9780521429900
ReleaseDate 0000-00-00

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Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions

Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work

Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy

Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries

Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy)

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Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking

Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Country	USA
Brand	Cambridge University Press
Manufacturer	Cambridge University Press
Binding	Paperback
ItemPartNumber	9780521429900
UnitCount	1
EANs	9780521429900
ReleaseDate	0000-00-00

Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics

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