The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice

Not Available / Digital Item

The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice

Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes, yet their behavior is not well understood, even among themselves. Using statistical methods, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making to dispel the mystery of how decisions from district courts to the Supreme Court are made.
Country USA
Manufacturer Harvard University Press
Binding Kindle Edition
ReleaseDate 2013-01-07
Format Kindle eBook

You might also like...

Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior

An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research

How Judges Think (Pims - Polity Immigration and Society Series)

The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited

Reflections on Judging

Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary

The Future of Law and Economics: Essays in Reform and Recollection

Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why Americans Are Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance (Inalienable Rights)