The Six-Day War: A Retrospective

"Brings the subject alive in the same multifaceted way that the real-life crisis was lived. . . . It probably will not be possible again to assemble this many individuals who were in policy-making positions during the 1967 war.  The interaction among them is invaluable. . . . Only a book of this kind . . . could convey that sense of partial knowledge, sharply conflicting perspectives, irrational actions, divided governments, even the closest friends not understanding each other."--Harold H. Saunders (National Security Council staff member at the White House during the Six-Day War), Kettering Foundation

Former Ambassador Richard B. Parker gathered representatives from the Israeli, Arab, Russian, and U.S. military, government, and academe, many of whom were participants in the 1967 crisis, to reexamine the steps and missteps that led to the conflict.  Developed from a State Department conference marking the 25th anniversary of the war, this analysis and discussion provide the most authoritative account we have of the genesis of the Arab-Israeli war.

Contents

Origins of the Crisis:  L. Carl Brown

The United Nations Response: I. William Zartman

The Israeli Response: Bernard Reich

The Other Arab Responses: E. Ernest Dawn

The View from Washington: Donald C. Bergus

Conspiracy Theories: Richard B. Parker

Conclusions: Richard B. Parker

Richard B. Parker, U.S. ambassador to Algeria, Lebanon, and Morocco from 1974 to 1979, retired from the Foreign Service in 1980.  He is the author of The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East and North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns, and he edited the Middle East Journal from 1981 to 1987.